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Abstract 
 
Surprisingly little is known about the relation between grades and wages. This 
relation is analysed using a sample of ca. 1’700 individuals that graduated in 
Swiss universities in 1998. Testing different operationalisations of the grade 
variable, we find a significant and robust effect of grades on the annual wage 
one year after graduation. When wage is specified as wage per actual hour of 
work, instead of formal hours of work, the effect becomes insignificant. Four 
years after graduation, however, grades have a higher and significant effect 
on wages based on formal working time as well as on wages based on actual 
working time. We conclude that people with higher grades get jobs with better 
career prospects when entering the labour market. Thus, the wage effect of 
university graduates’ final grades is non-transitory and increasing over time. 
This finding calls for further research in the role that grades play in labour 
markets. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The majority of research concerning the link between educational attainment 
and earnings has focussed on years of education as a - quantitative - 
measure for educational attainment. Less attention has been paid to quality 
indicators of education. This imbalance is partly due to the overwhelming 
success of the standard Mincer equation allowing for easy rates of return 
estimations, partly due to the existence of numerous data sets including the 
variables years of education and wage. These data sets allow for a wide 
range of model specifications and robustness checks in order to establish 
secure knowledge about the link between years of education and labour 
market outcome. 
This focus on years of education comes at the cost of neglecting potentially 
important aspects of this link, which may in turn lead to an incomplete picture, 
at best, or to a biased one in the worse case. 
3 
 
One qualitative variable that is readily available for employers when making 
employment decisions are grades. In most European countries it is common 
that job applicants include a copy of their highest attained educational 
certificate with their CV, so employers have full and credible information about 
the final grade the applicant received. 
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether Swiss university students’ final 
grade has a significant effect on their wages one and four years after 
graduation, i.e. whether grades are used as a relevant information by 
employers in the employment decision. 
 
Grades might have an effect on first wages no matter whether one analyses 
this question from the point of view of human capital theory or sorting 
(signalling, screening) theories. If education raises worker productivity, grades 
might be a measure for the extent to which an individual has actually acquired 
the knowledge that has been taught in the educational process. Two 
individuals that have followed the same education and received the same 
degrees might differ in their actual educational attainment and, thus, in their 
productivity, which is reflected by grades. From a signalling theory point of 
view, on the other hand, grades might serve as a signal containing additional 
information compared to years of education. If grades are correlated with 
desirable individual characteristics such as intelligence, motivation, 
perseverance and alike, employers will use the information contained in 
grades when building expectations about the productivity of future employees. 
So human capital and signalling theory both predict an effect of grades on 
wages, provided they contain additional information on workers' productivity 
not available through other observable characteristics.1  
 
It has, of course, early been acknowledged that quantitative measures of 
educational attainment alone are insufficient. Behrman and Birdsall (1983) 
expressed this in an article’s title: "The Quality of Schooling: Quantity alone is 
misleading". They concentrated on the effect of school quality on rates of 
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return, where quality itself depends on public resources allocated to schools. 
There exists a still growing body of literature on this issue.2 
Another branch of literature, starting with Griliches (1976), is concerned with 
IQ or aptitude test scores in wage regression models. These measures are 
likely to be correlated with grades. A fundamental difference lies in the non-
observability of IQ and test scores as opposed to grades for employers.3 
Therefore, an influence of the latter on (starting) wages is more likely than in 
the case of the former. 
 
Grades have been used in various respects in the empirical literature. Firstly, 
they are used as outcome measure in educational production functions. 
Dolton et al. (2003) estimate a stochastic frontier production function for 
students of a university in Spain taking examination performance as output 
measure. Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2003) analyse the effect of working 
during school on academic performance measured by the grade point 
average. Both papers implicitly assume that student’s grades contain 
information about the quality of schooling that is relevant to labour markets. 
 
Secondly, grades have also been used as explanatory variables in different 
models. Büchel and Pollmann-Schult (2001) show that higher secondary 
school grades reduce the risk of being overeducated. This result holds for 
pupils that achieved an intermediate leaving certificate, whereas grades do 
not explain the probability of overeducation neither for pupils with a lower nor 
with a higher leaving certificate. This finding suggests that the informational 
content of grades depends on the composition of the reference group. 
Furthermore, there exist some studies that consider the effect of grades on 
earnings. Wise (1975) used data pertaining to individuals working in a large 
US manufacturing corporation and demonstrated significant effects of 
                                                                                                                                            
1 Therefore, we will use the language of the human capital theory in the remainder of the 
paper. This does, however, not exclude signalling explanations of the discussed phenomena. 
2 On the effect of public resources on schools see, e.g., Card and Krueger (1992), Hanushek 
(2003), Krueger (2003). 
3 Of course, employers could conduct own IQ or aptitude tests for applicants. The results of 
these tests will, however, typically deviate from the test scores that are usually observed by 
econometricians in data sets. This is probably one reason why IQ and test scores have often 
been used as proxy or IV variable rather than as explanatory variable. 
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undergraduate as well as graduate grades on starting salaries. 
Weiss (1995: 141), however, in his review of human capital and signalling 
explanations of wages concludes: 
 
“Researchers have also looked at possible effects of secondary school 
grades and class rank on wages (...). In some regressions, small results 
are found some of the time. But the main message from studies on 
course work, test scores, and grades is that learning in high school does 
not seem to be a significant factor in explaining the correlation between 
secondary schooling and wages.” 
 
Carvajal et al. (2000) use earnings reported by 219 college (Business) 
graduates and earnings expectations reported by 248 college seniors in 
Florida to assess the inter-gender differential. They control for grade point 
average and find significant effects of grades on both, earnings expectations 
and earnings itself. The expected influence of grades is, however, 
overestimated by the college seniors compared to the true effect observed for 
college graduates. 
The abovementioned findings on the link between grades and earnings reveal 
a mixed picture. Whereas Weiss (1995) deems this link to be rather 
unimportant at least for high school grades, Wise (1975) and Carjaval et al. 
(2000) find significant effects for college graduates. Their data sets are, 
however, small and far from representative. To date, there exist no detailed 
analyses on the link between wages and grades using recent, representative 
data. This paper tries to fill this gap for the case of Swiss university graduates 
and their wages one and four years after graduation. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: 
Section 2 discusses under which conditions an influence of grades on 
earnings should be expected, and which model specifications can be derived 
from these considerations. Section 3 presents the data set used for the 
analyses in section 4, section 5 concludes. 
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2. Theoretical and model specification issues 
 
It has been argued above that grades should influence earnings in a human 
capital as well as in a signalling framework. This will hold true as long as 
grades contain some information on the productivity of workers. Two cases of 
interest can be distinguished: 
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Case (0) means that grades have no informational content relevant for labor 
markets, case (I) states there is such an informational content of grades. 
This content depends on the way grades are assigned by universities. Case 
(0) holds trivially if universities assign grades randomly. One might, however, 
expect that universities try to attract high-achieving (i.e., higher ability and/or 
more diligent) students and want to limit entry of low-achieving students. In 
this case, universities will use grades as a selection device: It is more costly 
for low-ability students to obtain passing grades and thus, university 
graduates are positively selected from the population. If universities succeed 
in designing exams that test learning ability and/or learning effort of students, 
then it is also very likely that success in these exams is positively correlated 
with the labor market productivity of students. 
Up to this point, the arguments substantiate the claim that university 
graduates as such should earn higher starting salaries than workers with less 
education, but the arguments are not yet sufficient to ensure that case (I) 
holds. In order to select between high- and low-achieving students, 
universities could assign only two grades: pass and fail. Then there are 
students who drop out, but for the graduating individuals there is no variance 
in grades. For case (I) to hold, passing grades must show some variance 
which is, in addition, to be correlated with knowledge and/or ability. 
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In this paper, we basically want to test the hypothesis characterized by 
equation (I) against the null hypothesis described by equation (0). To 
recapitulate: for (I) to hold, 
1. universities have to use grades as a selection mechanism by assigning 
grades using a scale with more than one passing grade, 
2. these grades have to be increasing in knowledge and/or ability in the mean, 
3. knowledge and/or ability, in turn, have to be correlated with productivity. 
 
Only if these conditions hold, employers can use the information in grades 
about the productivity of workers. Given this and given that the labor market 
rewards good grades, students have an incentive to work harder to achieve 
better grades (see Dolton et al. 2001 for an analysis of the time use of 
students). Their learning effort does not only reduce the risk of failing; even if 
they are sure to pass, there is a return to higher grades through higher wages. 
This provides an incentive if students expect that their grades will have an 
effect on wages. For a sample of students from two large Swiss universities, 
Wolter and Zbinden (2002) showed that students believing to be better 
performers also expect to have positive financial effects associated with their 
academic superiority. 
Of course, students might differ in their opportunity cost of learning for other 
reasons than differences in learning ability or in preferences for education. 
There might be a (individual) trade-off between working during one's studies 
and getting higher grades, for instance (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 
2003). As working could enhance wages after graduation, too, an empirical 
model should take working during studying into account. The same holds true 
for study length, as a short study length might be a signal of its own for high 
productivity, but at the same time study duration is likely to positively influence 
grades, ceteris paribus. There are more variables that might interfere in the 
relation between grades and earnings. Graduates with higher grades might be 
prone to accumulate even more human capital after graduation. Then they are 
likely to become university assistants or look for jobs which provide high 
amounts of on-the-job-training. From the theory of on-the-job training we 
would expect that this training is paid for at least partially by workers, namely 
by reduced wages (Becker 1964, Hashimoto 1981). In short, there exist a lot 
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of education-related variables like study length, work during study or on-the-
job training, that should be held constant when analysing grades and 
earnings. 
 
There is another theoretical question that merits comment. We assume that 
employers can observe the grades of applicants, but are they also informed 
about the relevant grade distribution, i.e. the grades of the applicant’s fellow 
students? Grades are an ordinal measure; therefore, their informational 
content depends crucially on the distribution of grades, at least on its mean 
and variance. It is not clear whether employers have enough information 
about the grade distribution. If the distribution differs between subjects, 
universities or graduation year, employers need full information on the 
relevant distribution in order to exploit the full informational content of grades. 
If not, they might use the grades of the different applicants they observe to 
form a belief about the relevant grade distribution, which will probably be 
skewed compared to the true one. Different employers may also have 
different knowledge about grades in certain subjects or universities. 
 
Our empirical analyses will address the different specification issues raised 
before by including education-related variables, on the one hand, and by 
using different variants of grade variables that account for grade distributions, 
on the other hand. 
 
 
3. The Swiss university system and the data 
 
Only 18.4% of a cohort receive a university entrance diploma (Maturität) in 
Switzerland (FSO 2003). This low value can be explained by the importance 
of the vocational education system, which also provides vocational tertiary 
educations, like the universities of applied science. These are not included in 
our data, we restrict attention to normal universities. 
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There exist eleven4 public universities in Switzerland and no comparable 
private ones. Their quality standards are usually regarded as broadly 
equivalent, i.e. contrary to the situation in the US or UK, quality differences 
have not been a major issue to date. 
For each subject, study plans define a regular study length of usually four 
years. The mean of study length in our sample is, however, considerably 
higher (5.5 years). This is due to the fact that most universities and most 
subjects do not have fixed curricula but offer a lot of leeway for students to 
choose lectures and, consequently, also study length. Many students profit 
from this liberty by working part-time besides studying. 
 
Since 1977, the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO) has surveyed every 
second cohort of university graduates. For the first time, the cohort 1998 has 
not only been surveyed in 1999, but also in 2002, i.e. four years after 
graduation.5 We use this data set that contains information on 6750 
individuals (response rate 59.2%). Of these, we only use graduates who 
earned a Lizentiat or Diplom degree and exclude state examinations (with the 
exception of medical exams), teacher licence (Patent) and doctorates, which 
leaves 5228 cases6. For the wage regressions, we drop people not working at 
the time of the survey and people who were employed for less than 80%. 
Finally, we only include cases with information about wage, grade7, age and 
study length. For the remaining 2067 cases8, missing values in other 
independent dummy variables were assigned to a separate dummy which was 
included in regression models. 
 
This data set is well suited to analyse the problem at hand as it is a 
                                                 
4 The university of Lucerne and the Università della Svizzera Italiana are new and offer only 
few subjects. Due to the small N in our data set, they do not appear in the tables of the paper. 
5 For further details concerning the data set see Schmidlin (2003). 
6 This means especially that we excluded state examinations for lawyers (bar exam). 
Furthermore, we excluded theology completely, as this study leads to a state examination for 
the majority of students. 
7 Grade questions were included only in the second wave survey in 2002. In the second 
wave, only people that had participated in the first wave were interviewed. 68% of these 
responded. Thus, 38.2% of the population of Swiss university graduates of the year 1998 
responded in both waves (Schmidlin 2003). 
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representative, recent survey. The limitation to university graduates has the 
advantage of netting out sheepskin effects. It is, however, not possible to 
analyse the effect of including grades on the coefficient of years of schooling. 
The data set encompassing data about two time points enables us to check 
whether the results of the starting wage regression can be confirmed for 
wages four years after graduation. Thus, the data provide a better 
understanding of the mid-career development of graduates. The second 
innovation in the 1998 survey is that, for the first time, graduates have been 
asked to indicate their final grade. 
The wage and grade variables will now be discussed in more detail. 
 
wage variables 
The questionnaire of each survey wave (1999 and 2002) contained questions 
on annual wage for the respective main occupation, the formal degree of 
employment and actual weekly working hours. From this information, two 
different variables for 1999 and 2002 have been computed: Annual wage 
standardized for fulltime (i.e., 100%) employment and actual hourly wage. The 
latter variable uses the information on actual weekly working hours, the former 
the information on the formal degree of employment. The wage variables 
relating to the year 1999 have been transformed to express real values with 
base year 20029. Thus, wages of 1999 and 2002 are directly comparable. All 
wage variables have been logarithmised for semi-log regressions. Graph 1 
shows the (unlogarithmised) distribution of annual wages in 1999 and 2002 
with base year 2002 (N99=1’716, N02=1’704)10. Within 3 years, not only the 
mean wage increases, but variance increases, too. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
8 Due to the different operationalisations of the wage as well as the grade variable, some 
cases can only be used for certain operationalisations. For this reason, the N of the 
regressions is usually around 1700. 
9 See the appendix for details. 
10 All reported figures concern only the cases that will also be used in the analyses of section 
4, even if the data set contains more valid observations for the variable under consideration.  
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Graph 1: Annual fulltime wages 1 and 4 years after graduation (base year 2002) 
 
Graph 2 depicts the distribution of hourly wages in 1999 and 2002 (N99=1’722, 
N02=1’696). The sample size has slightly changed because of deviations in 
the outlier deletion which are due to the actual weekly working hours variable 
which was not used for annual wages. 
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Graph 2: Hourly wages for actual working time, 1 and 4 years after graduation (base year 
2002) 
 
 
grade variables 
The grade variable cannot be used directly as it appears in the raw data set 
since there exists or existed a variety of different grade scales at Swiss 
universities. The most usual grade scale goes from 6 (best grade) to 1 (worst 
grade) with 4 being the minimal passing grade. There exist, however, also the 
scales 10/1, 8/1, 5/1, 4/1 and 1/4. Therefore, grades had to be made 
comparable. This was done in the following manner: 
 
pass
passi
i gg
gg
G
−
−
=
max
 
 
This transformation results in a grade variable ranging from 0 (minimal 
passing grade) to 1 (maximum grade). In order to execute this computation, 
information on the relevant maxg  and passg  for each observation was 
necessary. The questionnaire asked for the scale endpoints ( maxg  and ming ). 
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These data were often missing or implausible. Thus, the scale variables ( maxg  
and ming ) were carefully edited, whereas the actual grade variable remained 
unchanged.11 Furthermore, information from university deaneries has been 
collected about the minimal passing grade ( passg ) belonging to certain scales. 
Graph 3 shows the distribution of the transformed, i.e. comparable grade 
variable in the sample on a scale from 4 to 6 instead of 0 to 1 (N=2’067)12. 
 
Graph 3: Grade distribution (4: lowest passing grade, 6: maximum grade) 
 
The distribution does not look normal as one might have expected. Very low 
grades are seldom, and there is a tendency of clusters at 4.5, 5 and 5.5.13  
A problem of the grade variable is that this item has only been asked in the 
second wave of the survey. This entails two problems. First, data quality might 
be poor because people do not remember their grade accurately any more. 
Second, attrition in the second wave might be non-random and introduce 
endogeneity in the grade variable. The first problem seems to be limited as 
                                                 
11 The appendix gives more information on the editing rules that have been applied. 
12 In the graph, all cases were included that appear in the annual wage regression for 1999 or 
in the annual wage regression for 2002. 
13 For subjects with one or few final examinations, grade average is likely to have such a 
value. In subjects where the final grade is an average of many exams passed throughout 
study time, the clustering does not happen. 
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item non-response is low14. The second problem, potential endogeneity, will 
be adressed in section 4. 
 
Tables of summary statistics for all variables that will be used in the analyses 
can be found in the appendix, along with more technical detail on various 
variables. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
Wage regressions 1999 
Table 1 shows results of annual log-wage-regressions with different 
specifications. It contains four blocks of independent variables (besides grade 
and the constant): 1. university dummies (reference category: University of 
Zurich), 2. subject dummies (reference category: business & economics), 3. 
individual characteristics and 4. job characteristics. As pointed out in section 
2, we are able to take into account variables that are relevant from a 
theoretical point of view, such as training, study length or jobbing during study. 
Grades are significant15 in all models, with the coefficient and its significance 
rising when controlling for subjects. Model (4) indicates that an individual 
switching from the minimal passing grade to a maximum grade earns about 
9.6% more one year after graduation. 
 
 
                                                 
14 The non-response rate for the grade item is 8.0% (for the full sample of graduates who 
earned a Lizentiat, a Diplom degree or passed the medical state examinations and 
participated in the survey 2002). 
15 Significance levels based on t-values rely on central limit theorems which assume an 
infinite population. We use significance levels although the whole population of 1998 
graduates has received a questionnaire. We are interested in the effects not only for the 
cohort of 1998 but for generally valid results. I.e., we regard the cohort of 1998 graduates as 
the realisation of an infinite population of graduates. Therefore, we apply no finite population 
correction and use the standard 5% significance level. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) OLS: 
ln annual wage 99 b t16 b t b t b t 
grade 0.0854 3.04 0.0802 2.75 0.1010 3.46 0.0957 3.12 
Univ. Basel   -0.0305 -1.08   -0.0488 -1.74 
Univ. Berne   -0.0229 -0.93   -0.0226 -0.93 
Univ. Fribourg   -0.0234 -0.86   -0.0119 -0.43 
Univ. Geneva   -0.0489 -1.35   -0.0387 -1.08 
Univ. Lausanne   0.0030 0.09   0.0009 0.03 
Swiss Fed. Inst. of Technology 
Lausanne (EPFL)   -0.0299 -0.95   0.0332 0.86 
Univ. Neuchâtel   -0.0324 -0.70   -0.0240 -0.52 
Univ. St. Gall (HSG)   0.0161 0.49   0.0104 0.31 
Swiss Fed. Inst. of Technology 
Zurich (ETHZ)   -0.0418 -2.06   0.0199 0.69 
Arts & Humanities, 
Social Sciences     -0.0632 -3.12 -0.0624 -2.87 
Law     -0.0721 -3.42 -0.0717 -3.38 
Science     -0.0410 -2.05 -0.0498 -2.16 
Medicine, Pharmacy     0.1700 3.17 0.1747 3.20 
Technical Sciences     -0.0637 -3.03 -0.0951 -2.87 
Other subjects     -0.0824 -2.64 -0.1069 -2.67 
Age 0.0070 2.54 0.0067 2.45 0.0085 3.20 0.0085 3.19 
Male 0.0549 4.64 0.0566 4.68 0.0542 4.47 0.0536 4.38 
Foreigner -0.0043 -0.27 -0.0045 -0.29 -0.0014 -0.09 -0.0017 -0.11 
No. of Children 0.0513 2.96 0.0511 2.96 0.0458 2.71 0.0448 2.62 
Study length (no. of semesters) 0.0026 1.09 0.0024 0.95 0.0022 0.91 0.0024 0.95 
Jobbed during study: relation to 
study 0.0474 3.49 0.0467 3.38 0.0435 3.17 0.0453 3.27 
Jobbed during study: no relation to 
study 
 
0.0056 
 
0.43 
 
0.0039 
 
0.29 
 
0.0152 
 
1.16 
 
0.0179 
 
1.36 
                                                 
16 All OLS regressions in this paper are computed using Eicker-White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. 
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Potential Experience 0.0084 1.6 0.0089 1.7 0.0101 1.92 0.0101 1.94 
Potential Experience^2 -0.0003 -1.29 -0.0003 -1.28 -0.0003 -1.28 -0.0003 -1.28 
Dummies for earlier educational 
certificates yes  yes  yes  yes  
Dummies for Type of School 
Leaving Examination yes  yes  yes  yes  
Region of residence fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Part-time Work 0.0210 1.13 0.0202 1.08 0.0370 2.07 0.0349 1.95 
Internship -0.4463 -15.09 -0.4448 -14.98 -0.4208 -15.01 -0.4185 -14.88 
Assistant at University -0.0661 -2.16 -0.0640 -2.07 -0.0731 -2.32 -0.0750 -2.36 
External Doctorand -0.1015 -2.13 -0.0999 -2.11 -0.0990 -2.22 -0.0967 -2.13 
Public Service 0.2053 7.48 0.2025 7.3 0.2128 7.92 0.2128 7.84 
Private Firm, 10 - 49 employees 0.0928 3.54 0.0929 3.55 0.0930 3.59 0.0942 3.62 
Private Firm, 50 - 99 employees 0.1817 5.51 0.1815 5.47 0.1795 5.46 0.1828 5.54 
Private Firm, 100 - 499 employees 0.1721 7.39 0.1679 7.19 0.1675 7.47 0.1679 7.4 
Private Firm, 500+ employees 0.2046 9.89 0.2021 9.68 0.2002 9.69 0.2028 9.73 
Training >6 month completed 0.0218 0.79 0.0211 0.75 0.0249 0.91 0.0218 0.79 
Training >6 month started 0.0766 1.61 0.0784 1.7 0.0812 1.79 0.0831 1.83 
Job Temporary: <1 year -0.2452 -9.5 -0.2471 -9.55 -0.2504 -9.92 -0.2497 -9.79 
Job Temporary: 1-2 year -0.0849 -4.17 -0.0861 -4.19 -0.0924 -4.54 -0.0925 -4.5 
Job Temporary: 2-3 year -0.1088 -3.54 -0.1096 -3.56 -0.1119 -3.72 -0.1136 -3.76 
Job Temporary: >3 year -0.1509 -4.39 -0.1517 -4.43 -0.1543 -4.38 -0.1539 -4.32 
Economic sector fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Constant 10.5988 118.57 10.62898 114.16 10.56419 118.44 10.56707 113.89 
adj. R2 0.644  0.644  0.655  .654  
F 39.37  34.74  38.39  34.10  
N 1716  1716  1716  1716  
Table 1: OLS-Regression, dependent variable: ln annual wage 1999; Reference category: University of Zurich, Business & Economics, Female, Swiss, did 
not job during studying, worked fulltime in a private firm with 1 - 9 employees, followed no training and occupies a permanent job. Note: Regression models 
contain also further independent variables listed in table 9 in the appendix. 
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With the possible exception of the university of Basel, universities do not 
seem to matter. Does this finding support the opinion that quality differences 
between Swiss universities are minor? Franzen (2002) found significant 
differences between universities for several cross section regressions, 
including the 1999 FSO-survey, i.e. using the same data as we use. Our table 
1 is based on a smaller N as it contains the grade variable which has been 
asked only in the second survey. If we perform, however, the same regression 
without the grade variable and an N of 2692 cases, neither of the university 
dummies becomes significant on the 5% level, and coefficients are 
substantially lower (in absolute terms) than in Franzen (2002). This is 
probably due to the omission of relevant variables in Franzen’s regressions. It 
is known that wages differ between regions in Switzerland.17 As the place of 
study is obviously correlated with the working region one year after graduation 
(due to the relatively low mobility of students workers in Switzerland), it is 
important to control for working regions to separate the effects of study place 
and working region. We do not have data about the working region, but about 
the region of residence, which is likely to be highly correlated with the working 
region. The mere exclusion of the region of residence dummies in model (4) 
results in highly significant differences between wages of graduates from 
different universities - which cannot be considered as a causal effect, since a 
important part of the effect stems from working region differences.18 
Subjects19 have a very significant impact on starting wages. Medical 
graduates earn most20, followed by business & economics graduates and 
science graduates.  
There are several other significant variables, of which jobbing during study 
                                                 
17 Wages differ between Cantons, but also between the language regions. 
18 This statement is true if working region (or region of residence, in our case) and place of 
study are not highly collinear. This is not a problem, as there are 23 Cantons but only 9 
universities and mobility is high enough. Between language regions, however, mobility is 
more limited. 11% of the people that graduated at the universities of Geneva, Lausanne or 
Neuchâtel live in a non-frenchspeaking region one year after. This rate should still be 
sufficient to allow for a separation of the university and the working region effect. 
19 We are able to subdivide study subjects into more dummies. The grade variable is, 
however, hardly affected by different specifications of the subject variable. 
20 This result should not be overrated. Many medicine graduates occupy a position as medical 
assistant in a hospital. A lot of these characterised themselves as holding a temporary and/or 
internship position, Since the dummies controlling for this are highly negative, the medicine 
dummy might just counterbalance their effect. We do not further analyse this question 
because we are primarily interested in the grade variable. 
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deserves comment. This rises starting wage significantly if the job was related 
to the study subject, but only slightly (and insignificantly) if this was not the 
case. Study length does not matter for starting wages. 
 
A first objection against the result concerning grades might be that grades 
could have a non-linear effect on wages. In order to test this, we subdivided 
the grade scale into 5 equally wide intervals and created 5 dummies. As can 
be seen in table 2, this dummy structure exhibits a roughly linear pattern: the 
positive coefficients rise for each dummy. There is a moderate jump when 
changing from dummy 4 to dummy 5, so grades in the upper 20% of the scale 
are possibly rewarded superproportionally. 
A second possible critique pertains to our absolute definition of grades. As 
discussed in section 2, grades are an ordinal measure. Thus, their 
informational content depends on the grade distribution of the peers, and if 
employers have information about this distribution, they will take into account 
relative rather than absolute grades. Table 2 contains three different 
specifications of relative grades. First, we built quintiles for all grade 
distributions in 10 universities and 7 subjects, i.e., for 70 distributions or strata. 
The quintile dummies are the relative counterpart to the absolute grade 
dummies discussed above. Then, we standardized grades: 
 
h
hhis
hi
GG
G
σ
−
= ,,  
 
where h denotes a certain stratum. The variable “grade standardized 1” was 
built using the same 70 strata as for the quintile dummies. “Grade 
standardized 2” neglects universities and takes 17 different subjects as strata. 
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(5) (6) (7) (8) OLS: 
ln annual wage 99 b t b t b t b t 
grade dummy: 0.2 - 0.4 0.0360 1.30       
grade dummy: 0.4 - 0.6 0.0514 1.96       
grade dummy: 0.6 - 0.8 0.0634 2.30       
grade dummy: 0.8 - 1 0.0947 2.92       
grade 2nd quintile   -0.0031 -0.23     
grade 3rd quintile   -0.0034 -0.28     
grade 4th quintile   0.0130 1.02     
grade 5th quintile   0.0376 2.57     
grade standardized 1     0.0203 3.54   
grade standardized 2       0.0160 2.77 
Arts & Humanities, 
Social Sciences -0.0594 -2.73 -0.0530 -2.5 -0.0461 -2.24 -0.0478 -2.32 
Law -0.0722 -3.41 -0.0739 -3.45 -0.0721 -3.39 -0.0742 -3.49 
Science -0.0485 -2.09 -0.0371 -1.64 -0.0320 -1.42 -0.0328 -1.46 
Medicine, Pharmacy 0.1756 3.20 0.1820 3.33 0.1852 3.41 0.1874 3.42 
Technical Sciences -0.0921 -2.77 -0.0896 -2.73 -0.0853 -2.61 -0.0827 -2.53 
Other Subjects -0.1042 -2.59 -0.0969 -2.47 -0.0928 -2.38 -0.0933 -2.37 
Study length (no. of semesters) 0.0023 0.90 0.0024 0.93 0.0026 1.00 0.0025 0.99 
Jobbed during study: relation to 
study 0.0458 3.29 0.0460 3.29 0.0452 3.26 0.0454 3.27 
Jobbed during study: no relation 
to study 0.0178 1.35 0.0192 1.45 0.0184 1.40 0.0180 1.36 
Constant 10.567 113.90 10.606 118.55 10.603 118.30 10.610 118.17 
adj. R2 0.655  0.654  0.655  0.654  
F 33.02  33.05  34.16  34.03  
N 1716  1715  1715  1716  
Table 2: OLS-Regression, dependent variable: ln annual wage 1999; Reference category: for grade dummy variables the first category, respectively, for all 
other dummies as in table 1; Note: Regressions contain also the independent variables listed in table 9 in the appendix. 
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Neither of these relative specifications of grades changes the result that 
grades have a significant impact on annual starting wages. The quintile 
dummies are less significant than the absolute grade dummies, which might 
indicate that employers do not have information about the relevant 
distribution. Standardized grades, however, are as significant as the absolute 
grade variable in table 1. 
 
Finally, it could be the case that there are significant effects of grades in 
certain subjects which mask the lack of effects in other subjects. Table 4 uses 
various interaction effects to test for this possibility. 
Indeed, we now find a significant effect only for law graduates. The other 
coefficients are positive (with the exception of medicine and pharmacy with a 
very small negative coefficient), but insignificant. It is the “aggregation” of 
these rather small positive effects in most subjects and the very marked effect 
for law graduates in a single grade variable that leads to the overall significant 
effect of grades in table 1. 
Why is the effect so much stronger for law graduates? First, law is a subject 
with many students: In 1998, 15.8% of all graduates at Swiss universities 
were law graduates (FSO 1999). As law prepares for a wide variety of jobs, it 
is plausible that students are very heterogenous. Second, law study curricula 
are very strict as opposed to many other study curricula. E.g., law can usually 
not be studied along with a minor subject. Furthermore, students have very 
limited choice between different courses. Whereas students in most subjects 
can specialize by choosing a very individual portfolio of major subject, minor 
subject and even choosing the courses attended within these, law students 
have a highly standardized education. Combining these two factors, law 
graduates are very heterogenous in their ability-composition, but very 
homogenous in their education. In this situation, grades might be a very 
effective signal: both because there is an important variance in the ability 
distribution and because grades between different graduates are really 
comparable since they concern the same courses. 
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(9) OLS: 
ln annual wage 99 b t 
grade X (Arts & Humanities, Social Sciences) 0.0558 0.83 
grade X (Business, Economics) 0.0797 1.32 
grade X Law 0.2904 3.22 
grade X Science 0.0107 0.16 
grade X (Medicine, Pharmacy) -0.0097 -0.14 
grade X Technical Sciences 0.1055 1.77 
grade X Other Subjects 0.3218 1.57 
Univ. Basel -0.0501 -1.76 
Univ. Berne -0.0252 -1.03 
Univ. Fribourg -0.0126 -0.46 
Univ. Geneva -0.0484 -1.33 
Univ. Lausanne -0.0057 -0.18 
Swiss Fed. Inst. of Technology Lausanne 
(EPFL) 0.0306 0.78 
Univ. Neuchâtel -0.0383 -0.82 
Univ. St. Gall (HSG) 0.0097 0.29 
Swiss Fed. Inst. of Technology Zurich 
(ETHZ) 0.0140 0.49 
Arts & Humanities, 
Social Sciences -0.0449 -0.88 
Law -0.1649 -3.28 
Science -0.0020 -0.04 
Medicine, Pharmacy 0.2356 3.42 
Technical Sciences -0.1050 -2.01 
Other Subjects -0.2493 -1.86 
Study length (no. of semesters) 0.0022 0.87 
Jobbed during study: relation to study 0.0463 3.33 
Jobbed during study: no relation to study 0.0193 1.46 
Constant 10.571 110.61 
adj. R2 .655  
F 32.36  
N 1716  
Table 3: OLS-Regression, dependent variable: ln annual wage 1999; Reference category: as 
in table 1; Note: Regressions contain also the independent variables listed in table 9 in the 
appendix. 
 
 
After analysing different specifications of grades, we now turn to a different 
specification of the wage variable. The annual wage variable has been built 
using formal working time and standardizing wages to a 100% fulltime job. 
Now we use hourly wages where not formal working time has been used, but 
actual weekly working time as reported by graduates. 
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Table 5 shows the result for hourly starting wages. Now the coefficient for 
grades drops by one third and is no more significant. The standardized (i.e., 
relative) grade variable is significant at the 10% level of significance, but the 
coefficient has dropped, too. Interaction effects show that grades remain 
important for law graduates, but for some other subjects the sign has turned 
negative (but remains clearly insignificant). Overall, the case for grades 
having an impact on first wages has become weak.21 
This change can be explained as follows22: People with higher grades work 
more hours per week in jobs that entail the same formal working time. It 
seems that people who work harder in university (and thus get higher grades) 
also work harder later on. 
One might ask which operationalisation of wages is the “right” one, using 
formal or actual working time? From the point of view of the students, the right 
one is the one on which they base their study-related decisions. It is possible 
that they prefer a higher annual wage even when their wage per actually 
worked hour remains the same. We would have to specify a labour supply 
function to determine this. Another hypothesis might be that students look at 
formal wages ignoring the fact that a higher wage entails more work, i.e., 
students would behave irrationally and suffer from “wage illusion”. From the 
point of view of employers, the right wage variable is the one that is closest 
related to actual productivity. If those people that work more are proportionally 
more productive, wage per actual working time is relevant.23 
 
We are not able to decide on which wage variable is better than the other and 
prefer to explain where the correlation of grades and working time accrues 
from. We will propose two hypotheses which we call the intrinsic and the 
extrinsic motivation hypothesis, respectively. These will provide the base for 
the analyses of the second wave results. 
                                                 
21 For the 1999 regressions, this pattern basically holds also for regressions run separately for 
females and males (see appendix C). 
22 The differing result does not depend on the differing N: Running the annual wage 
regression only with cases for which there is a hourly wage, too, gives a significant grade 
coefficient, and vice versa. 
23 From the point of view of data quality, finally, we prefer the annual wage variable as the 
formal working time variable seems more reliable than the variable about actual working time 
which contains more outliers. 
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(10) (11) (12) OLS: 
ln hourly wage 99 b t b t b t 
grade 0.0561 1.53     
grade standardized 1   0.0128 1.88   
grade X (Arts & Humanities, Social 
Sciences)     0.0869 1.07 
grade X (Business, Economics)     -0.0515 -0.72 
grade X Law     0.2663 2.75 
grade X Science     -0.0131 -0.15 
grade X (Medicine, Pharmacy)     -0.0350 -0.38 
grade X Technical Sciences     0.0530 0.75 
grade X Other Subjects     -0.0160 -0.05 
Arts & Humanities, 
Social Sciences -0.0276 -1.13 -0.0176 -0.77 -0.0909 -1.47 
Law -0.0643 -2.65 -0.0643 -2.65 -0.2046 -3.69 
Science -0.0543 -1.96 -0.0438 -1.61 -0.0557 -0.85 
Medicine, Pharmacy 0.0943 1.94 0.1009 2.09 0.1042 1.3 
Technical Sciences -0.1328 -3.51 -0.1272 -3.39 -0.1746 -2.85 
Other Subjects -0.0713 -1.42 -0.0636 -1.29 -0.0699 -0.3 
Study length (no. of semesters) 0.0012 0.40 0.0013 0.42 0.0006 0.21 
Jobbed during study: relation to study 0.0458 2.93 0.0456 2.91 0.0466 2.98 
Jobbed during study: no relation to study 0.0227 1.50 0.0230 1.52 0.0228 1.51 
Constant 2.984 28.47 3.003 29.59 3.030 27.48 
adj. R2 0.548  0.548  0.550  
F 22.29  22.31  21.16  
N 1722  1721  1722  
Table 4: OLS-Regression, dependent variable: ln hourly wage 1999, based on actual (instead of formal) working time; Reference category: as in table 1; 
Note: Regressions contain also the independent variables listed in table 9 in the appendix. 
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Endogeneity 
Before turning to these hypotheses, we have to deal with the problem of 
potential endogeneity of grades. 
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Equation (1) is the population equation of interest where the grade variable is 
assumed to be exogenous. The grade variable is described by the linear 
projection of equation (2). It can, however, only be observed if the indicator 
variable I is 1. The estimated equation is: 
 
(4)              )99ln( ,1,1,1,1 ssssss GXw εαβ ++=  
 
where s denotes the subsample of people that responded in the second wave. 
If, for instance, ability is correlated with grades (equation 2) as well as with the 
decision to participate in the second wave (equation 3), then grades will not 
be exogenous in equation 4, i.e. 1,1ˆ αα →s  will not hold. 
How can this problem be overcome? A standard selection model does not 
help as these are designed for cases with censored or truncated dependent 
variables, not missing independent variables. We can, however, use a 
selection model to impute the missing observations in grades, taking into 
account possible selection effects. This method provides us with consistent 
estimates of the missing grades (provided the identification assumption holds) 
and we can use the imputed variable to estimate equation (1) with the full 
sample.24 
A two-step Heckman estimation is used to impute the grade variable. The first 
step probit includes the weekly time for sports the person invested in 1999, 
                                                 
24 Wooldridge (2002: 567ff.) proposes another method where only the observed subsample is 
used for the wage regression. In order to account for endogeneity, the grade variable is to be 
instrumented, and the inverse mills ratio of a probit (dependent variable: observed/not 
observed) should be included. This method needs two instruments and, accordingly, two 
identifying assumptions. The reason why we need only one is that we use the observed wage 
data for the cases where grades are not observed. 
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which is not included in the grade regression. This exclusion restriction can be 
motivated as follows: It is assumed that the more sports a person practises, 
the less time it has to fill in the questionnaire of the 2002 survey. As sports 
often entails regular trainings, typically weekly or several times a week, it is 
likely that sportive persons do not abstain from training to spare time for the 
questionnaire and are less likely to complete it. Further, we assume that the 
time someone invests in sport is not correlated with grades. This means, we 
believe that sportive persons are neither more intelligent nor more able than 
non-sportive people, and vice versa. 
Table 5 shows the two-step Heckman model used to impute 911 missing 
values in the grade variable. The selection term is not significant, so grades of 
2nd wave participants and non-participants do not differ.  
 
1. Selection (Probit)  2. grade regression Heckman 2step: 
grade b t  b t 
weekly time for sports -0.0232 -2.99    
Univ. Basel -0.0477 -0.31 
 
0.0398 1.57 
Univ. Berne -0.1353 -1.1  0.0023 0.11 
Univ. Fribourg -0.1668 -1.27  -0.0295 -1.25 
Univ. Geneva -0.4956 -3.17  -0.0914 -2.38 
Univ. Lausanne -0.3429 -2.37  0.0796 2.64 
Swiss Fed. Inst. of 
Technology Lausanne 
(EPFL) -0.2090 -1.12 
 
0.0626 1.87 
Univ. Neuchâtel -0.6429 -3.18  -0.0621 -1.2 
Univ. St. Gall (HSG) -0.4479 -3.09  0.0434 1.22 
Swiss Fed. Inst. of 
Technology Zurich (ETHZ) -0.1351 -0.9 
 
-0.0616 -2.33 
Arts & Humanities, 
Social Sciences -0.0088 -0.08 
 
0.1720 9.52 
Law -0.4102 -3.06  0.0002 0.01 
Science -0.1803 -1.48  0.1810 7.81 
Medicine, Pharmacy -0.0460 -0.24  0.1354 4.13 
Technical Sciences -0.1432 -0.83  0.1508 4.88 
Other subjects 0.1130 0.43  0.2252 5.48 
Age -0.0363 -3.36 
 
-0.0054 -1.95 
Male 0.0305 0.52  0.0030 0.3 
Foreigner -0.1189 -1.66  -0.0205 -1.46 
No. of Children 0.0675 0.84  -0.0088 -0.64 
Study length (no. of 
semesters) 0.0050 0.43 
 
-0.0027 -1.37 
Jobbed during study: relation 
to study 0.0262 0.4 
 
0.0259 2.31 
Jobbed during study: no 0.1764 2.67  -0.0105 -0.74 
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relation to study 
Potential Experience 0.0122 0.47  0.0032 0.74 
Potential Experience^2 -0.0002 -0.15  -0.0001 -0.29 
Dummies for earlier 
educational certificates yes  
 
yes  
Dummies for Type of School 
Leaving Examination yes  
 
yes  
Region of residence fixed 
effects yes  
 
yes  
Part-time Work 0.0436 0.53 
 
-0.0070 -0.5 
Internship 0.1220 1.12  -0.0116 -0.61 
Assistant at University -0.2550 -1.95  0.0242 0.85 
External Doctorand -0.2047 -0.98  0.0340 0.87 
Public Service 0.2072 1.98  0.0274 1.32 
Private Firm, - employees 0.1386 1.3  0.0476 2.48 
Private Firm, - employees 0.2855 1.73  0.0528 1.79 
Private Firm, - employees -0.0366 -0.31  0.0963 4.66 
Private Firm, - employees 0.0889 0.86  0.0823 4.56 
Training >6 month completed 0.1803 1.21  0.0073 0.29 
Training >6 month started 0.2555 0.84  -0.0166 -0.32 
Job Temporary: <1 year -0.1374 -1.34  -0.0084 -0.43 
Job Temporary: 1-2 year -0.0636 -0.69  0.0083 0.53 
Job Temporary: 2-3 year 0.1341 0.97  0.0550 2.36 
Job Temporary: >3 year -0.0739 -0.44  0.0564 1.9 
Economic sector fixed effects yes   yes  
Constant 1.480 3.86  0.659 9.97 
rho -0.4443     
sigma 0.1784     
lambda    0.0793 -0.77 
Pseudo-R2 0.052     
LR chi2 (95) / Wald chi2 
(191) 177.37  
 
813.73  
N 2635   2635  
Table 5: Heckman 2stage estimation for the imputation of missing cases in the grade variable 
 
annual wage (13) hourly wage (14) 3rd step: OLS 
ln wage 99 b t b t 
grade (imputed) 0.0896 2.98 0.0291 0.83 
Univ. Basel -0.0491 -2.15 -0.0092 -0.32 
Univ. Berne -0.0359 -1.8 -0.0075 -0.35 
Univ. Fribourg -0.0357 -1.56 0.0003 0.01 
Univ. Geneva -0.0373 -1.4 -0.0184 -0.61 
Univ. Lausanne -0.0191 -0.75 0.0151 0.53 
Swiss Fed. Inst. of 
Technology Lausanne 
(EPFL) 0.0392 1.32 0.0769 2.29 
Univ. Neuchâtel -0.0241 -0.72 0.0410 1.11 
Univ. St. Gall (HSG) 0.0201 0.82 -0.0244 -0.97 
Swiss Fed. Inst. of 
Technology Zurich (ETHZ) 0.0259 1.08 0.0247 0.88 
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Arts & Humanities, 
Social Sciences -0.0755 -4.3 -0.0191 -1.01 
Law -0.0467 -2.66 -0.0266 -1.29 
Science -0.0723 -3.77 -0.0354 -1.65 
Medicine, Pharmacy 0.1370 3.28 0.0219 0.56 
Technical Sciences -0.1299 -4.88 -0.1069 -3.51 
Other subjects -0.1337 -3.97 -0.0320 -0.77 
Age 0.0070 3.65 0.0065 3.05 
Male 0.0549 5.61 0.0259 2.34 
Foreigner 0.0133 1.11 0.0069 0.51 
No. of Children 0.0615 4.56 0.0431 3.08 
Study length (no. of 
semesters) 0.0030 1.53 -0.0013 -0.59 
Jobbed during study: relation 
to study 0.0340 3.16 0.0185 1.53 
Jobbed during study: no 
relation to study 0.0129 1.23 0.0253 2.18 
Potential Experience 0.0027 0.64 0.0072 1.47 
Potential Experience^2 0.0000 0.22 -0.0002 -1.00 
Dummies for earlier 
educational certificates yes    
Dummies for Type of School 
Leaving Examination yes    
Region of residence fixed 
effects yes    
Part-time Work 0.0377 2.66 0.0235 1.43 
Internship -0.4041 -17.54 -0.3578 -15 
Assistant at University -0.0553 -2.48 -0.0747 -2.97 
External Doctorand -0.1366 -3.92 -0.1841 -4.97 
Public Service 0.1952 9.22 0.1248 5.18 
Private Firm, - employees 0.0952 4.5 0.0676 2.83 
Private Firm, - employees 0.1593 5.85 0.1059 3.89 
Private Firm, - employees 0.1663 8.93 0.1406 6.68 
Private Firm, - employees 0.1898 11.03 0.1583 8.46 
Training >6 month completed 0.0300 1.33 0.0275 1.22 
Training >6 month started 0.0629 1.73 0.0834 1.92 
Job Temporary: <1 year -0.2478 -12.26 -0.2467 -11.11 
Job Temporary: 1-2 year -0.0990 -6.18 -0.1509 -8.39 
Job Temporary: 2-3 year -0.0941 -3.9 -0.1265 -4.52 
Job Temporary: >3 year -0.1387 -5.33 -0.1850 -6.02 
Economic sector fixed effects yes  yes  
Constant 10.803 167.63 3.180 39.89 
adj. R2 0.650  0.558  
F 51.49  32.29  
N 2692  2631  
Table 6: wage regressions using the grade variable imputed as reported in table 5 
 
Table 6 shows that the main message does not change when using the 
sample of more than 2600 observations where missing grades have been 
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imputed. The grade coefficient is similar to the one in table 1 for annual wage 
and drops for hourly wage. This drop is even more markedly than for the 
smaller sample, though.25 
 
Explaining the findings for 1 year after graduation: hypotheses 
We continue now to explain this striking difference of the results for annual 
formal wages and actual hourly wages. As already mentioned, two 
hypotheses can be brought forward: 
 
1. Students differ with respect to their motivation for study and work. E.g., 
there are differences in preferences for education and work between 
individuals. If the preferences for education and for work are correlated, 
more interested and diligent students also work more diligently. This is the 
intrinsic motivation explanation. According to this explanation, motivated 
students like to work more than their colleagues and therefore work more in 
university as well as on their first job. 
Version 1a of this explanation states that grades have no causal effect on 
the first job and salaries, grades are just correlated with actual working time 
and thus, indirectly, with annual wages. 
Version 1b states that students with higher grades are more likely to get 
their preferred jobs, i.e., they can carry out the work they want to and 
receive more satisfaction from their work. Therefore, they are also willing to 
work more. According to Version 1b, grades have a causal effect on the 
worker-job matches and, thus, only indirectly via preferences again, on 
working time and annual wage. 
2. Students with higher grades occupy different jobs than students with lower 
grades. These jobs offer better career prospects: they are beginner's 
positions which qualify for later promotion if workers fulfill employer’s 
expectations. The motivation of graduates is extrinsic, as they receive an 
option value for promotion and, eventually, higher earnings per actual 
working time in the future. 
 
                                                 
25 The reported t-values are not entirely correct, as the imputation of predicted values for 
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How do these hypotheses relate to our initial hypotheses in section 2? For 
annual wages based on formal working time, hypothesis (I) from section 2 has 
been confirmed. Our new hypotheses deal with the fact that the case is not so 
clear when looking at hourly wages based on actual working time. Hypothesis 
(1) says that grades have no direct, causal influence on actual hourly wages., 
i.e., for these wages the null hypothesis (0) from section 2 is renewed. 
Hypothesis (2), on the contrary, states that grades do have a causal influence 
on wages even when taking into account actual working time. This influence, 
however, can only be detected in the mid- or long-term. 
The following sections will be dedicated to testing these hypotheses. 
 
Job adequacy 
First, we test whether graduates with higher grades occupy jobs where they 
are more satisfied (hypothesis 1b). Job satisfaction has not directly been 
asked. The questionnaire contains questions about the adequacy of the job 
relatively to the own education concerning 
1. the knowledge acquired during studies, 
2. the possibility to produce and realize own ideas and 
These were used as dependent variables in ordered probit model models. 
Grades have a significant effect26, as is illustrated in Graph 4 and 5: 
graduates with higher grades think that they can use more of their skills and 
knowledge, and they deem themselves more able to produce and realize own 
ideas at their job. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
roughly one third of the grades has not been accounted for in the OLS covariance matrix. 
26 On the 10 percent significance level for the first, on the 5 percent level for the second item. 
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Graph 4: Predicted distribution of answers to the question: “My opinion is that my actual job is 
adequate compared to my education concerning my possibilities to use my knowledge and 
skills“; Results of a ordered probit model; Reference category: Reference category: University 
of Zurich, Business/Economics, Female, Swiss, did not job during studying, worked fulltime in 
a private firm with 1 - 9 employees, followed no training and occupies a permanent job. Note: 
Regression models contains the independent variables listed in table 9 in the appendix 
(without wage variables). 
 
 
Graph 5: Predicted distribution of answers to the question: “My opinion is that my actual job is 
adequate compared to my education concerning my possibilities to exert influence.“; Results 
of a ordered probit model; Reference category: as in Graph 4. Note: Regression models 
contains the independent variables listed in table 9 in the appendix (without wage variables). 
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For the first year after graduation we find some evidence for hypothesis 1b. 
Graduates with higher grades seem to occupy jobs where they find more 
room for personal development. 
Does this finding still hold four years after graduation? The analysis is 
hampered by the fact that the relevant items have been reformulated in the 
second wave questionnaire. For the broadly similar questions concerning the 
use of one’s professional qualities and one’s possibility to realize own ideas, 
the ordered probit regressions show no significant results for the grade 
variable any more. The results one year after graduation seem to be of 
transitory nature. Overall, support for hypothesis 1b is weak. Graduates with 
higher grades are not rewarded intrinsically via a more satisfactory job in the 
mid-term. 
 
 
Wage regressions 2002 
In order to evaluate career prospects (hypothesis 2), we will use the second 
wave data, i.e. the survey conducted four years after graduation. We do not 
know which is the relevant time period after which the potential career effects 
predicted by the hypothesis can be observed. The three years in between the 
two surveys may be regarded as a rather short period. On the other hand, 
graph 1 and 2 have shown that wages developed strongly in this period. 
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(15) (16) (17) OLS: 
ln annual wage 02 b t b t b t 
grade 0.1397 4.23     
grade standardized 1   0.0272 4.40   
grade X (Arts & Humanities, Social Sciences)     0.1294 1.74 
grade X (Business, Economics)     0.2663 3.53 
grade X Law     -0.0433 -0.60 
grade X Science     0.0228 0.26 
grade X (Medicine, Pharmacy)     0.1781 2.20 
grade X Technical Sciences     0.2226 3.01 
grade X Other Subjects     0.2767 0.85 
Arts & Humanities, 
Social Sciences -0.1235 -5.19 -0.1012 -4.45 -0.0650 -1.11 
Law -0.0400 -1.73 -0.0426 -1.84 0.0900 1.92 
Science -0.1452 -5.64 -0.1201 -4.80 -0.0192 -0.28 
Medicine, Pharmacy27 -0.0973 -1.92 -0.0829 -1.64 -0.0700 -1.08 
Technical Sciences -0.2060 -5.61 -0.1913 -5.22 -0.2072 -3.29 
Other Subjects -0.2223 -4.20 -0.2020 -3.87 -0.2612 -1.14 
Study length (no. of semesters) 0.0014 0.52 0.0016 0.60 0.0019 0.72 
Jobbed during study: relation to study 0.0440 3.07 0.0445 3.11 0.0430 2.96 
Jobbed during study: no relation to study 0.0108 0.75 0.0118 0.82 0.0107 0.75 
Constant 11.206 97.67 11.263 99.53 11.153 93.77 
adj. R2 0.432  0.432  0.434  
F 13.62  13.87  13.12  
N 1662  1660  1662  
table 7 : OLS-Regression, dependent variable ln annual wage 02 ; Reference category: University of Zurich, Business & Economics, Female, Swiss, did not 
job during studying, worked fulltime in a private firm with 1 - 9 employees, followed no training and occupies a non-permanent job; Note: Regressions contain 
also the independent variables listed in table 10 in the appendix. 
                                                 
27 The coefficients for this dummy are not directly comparable to the 1999 regressions results due to a change in the questionnaires (see appendix, p. xx). 
33 
Models (15) and (16) in table 7 show higher and more significant coefficients for the 
grade variables than the respective regressions for 1999, (4) and (7). This means 
that four years after graduation, the effect of grades – whether defined in absolute or 
relative terms - on wage is slightly more pronounced than after one year for formal 
annual wages. This result provides already some support for hypothesis 2: 
graduates with higher grades are more successful than their fellows in the mid-term. 
Model (17) shows, however, that the effect of grades differs strongly across 
subjects. First, the coefficient for law graduates has changed drastically. In the first-
year regressions, grades had a major impact only for law graduates, now the 
coefficient has become insignificant and has even changed sign. One reason might 
be that an important fraction of law graduates prepares for state-run examinations 
after graduation.28 Therefore, there exist two distinct career paths directly after 
graduation that typically lead to different jobs, i.e. to different labour market 
segments.29 The state exam in itself constitutes a information that might replace the 
information of grades from university, all the more as the state exam is graded, too, 
and these new grades might be valued higher by employers than the preceding 
grades. 
A second striking observation concerning model (17) is the significance of grades in 
the subjects “Business, Economics”, “Medicine, Pharmacy” and “Technical 
Sciences”. Especially for the first and the latter category it seems plausible that 
graduates with higher grades enjoy better career prospects that can be detected in 
the form of higher wages four years after graduation. 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 In order to be admitted to these examinations, one has to complete internships of, in sum, at least 
one and a half year at a court as well as at a barrister’s. 
29 The state exam is necessary not only in order to work as a barrister, but also for most positions in 
justice and typically for higher positions in legal departments. 
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(18) (19) (20) OLS: 
ln hourly wage 02 b t b t b t 
grade 0.0667 1.81     
grade standardized 1   0.0136 1.98   
grade X (Arts & Humanities, Social Sciences)     0.0197 0.23 
grade X (Business, Economics)     0.1388 1.65 
grade X Law     -0.0912 -1.18 
grade X Science     0.0505 0.57 
grade X (Medicine, Pharmacy)     0.0549 0.54 
grade X Technical Sciences     0.2078 2.60 
grade X Other Subjects     -0.1045 -0.38 
Arts & Humanities, 
Social Sciences -0.0944 -3.52 -0.0838 -3.29 -0.0371 -0.59 
Law -0.0320 -1.26 -0.0330 -1.31 0.0628 1.23 
Science -0.1073 -3.61 -0.0951 -3.34 -0.0685 -0.98 
Medicine, Pharmacy -0.0909 -1.67 -0.0837 -1.54 -0.0568 -0.73 
Technical Sciences -0.1666 -4.17 -0.1595 -4.02 -0.2189 -3.27 
Other Subjects -0.1069 -1.95 -0.0972 -1.81 0.0264 0.14 
Study length (no. of semesters) 0.0022 0.75 0.0023 0.79 0.0025 0.86 
Jobbed during study: relation to study 0.0271 1.78 0.0273 1.79 0.0259 1.69 
Jobbed during study: no relation to study 0.0063 0.40 0.0068 0.44 0.0064 0.41 
Constant 3.493 25.90 3.518 26.24 3.465 25.50 
adj. R2 0.501  0.501  0.502  
F 17.60  17.89  16.83  
N 1652  1650  1652  
table 8 : OLS-Regression, dependent variable ln hourly wage 02 ; Reference category: University of Zurich, Business & Economics, Female, Swiss, did not 
job during studying, worked fulltime in a private firm with 1 - 9 employees, followed no training and occupies a non-permanent job; Note: Regressions contain 
also the independent variables listed in table 10 in the appendix. 
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Table 8 shows the regression results for actual hourly wages. Again, the 
coefficients are smaller and less significant than for formal annual wages, but 
this time they remain significant: at the 10 percent level for the absolute 
definition of grades, and at the 5 percent level for the relative opera-
tionalisation of grades. Model (20) exhibits that, with the exception of “Other 
subjects” and the somewhat intriguing case of “law” we have discussed 
above, the remaining interacted subject coefficients are positive. Only the 
interacted coefficient for “Technical Science” is significant, however, and the 
coefficient for “Business, Economics” just misses 10 percent significance. 
 
Overall, the effect of grades on wages becomes more robust four years after 
graduation.30,31 It remains restricted to certain subjects and is stronger for 
formal wages as opposed to wages taking into account actual working time. 
Interestingly, the relative operationalisation of grades seems to fit slightly 
better four years after graduation. At least for graduates of “Business, 
Economics” and “Technical Sciences”, we find supportive evidence for 
hypothesis 2. I.e., graduates in these subjects with higher grades benefit from 
higher wages not directly after graduation, but some years after graduation. 
On entering the labour market, grades help them to find positions that are 
more promising for the future, the effect of which can only be measured later 
on. This means that grades do not only have a transitory effect on graduates’ 
labour market outcomes and that they probably affect their lifetime income in 
a significant way. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We have analysed the effect of university final grades on the wages one and 
four years after graduation in a representative sample of persons that 
graduated 1998 in Swiss universities. We have found significant effects for 
annual wages, but less clear effects when wages are based on actual working 
                                                 
30 This effect is driven by males alone, as can be seen in table 11 in appendix C. 
31 We can, however, not apply our test for endogeneity used above as here not only the grade variable 
but also the wage variable and job characteristics are missing for people not participating in the second 
wave. 
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time reported by individuals rather than on formal working time. For this case, 
the effect of grades is insignificant after one year but becomes significant after 
four years, at least for certain subjects. These findings are robust regarding 
different operationalisations of the grade variable as well as for a correction of 
sample attrition. In contrast to this, we have not found evidence for the 
hypothesis that people with higher grades (and higher working hours) have a 
higher intrinsic motivation in the mid-term. 
 
We interpret these findings as follows: University graduates with higher 
grades find jobs with higher formal wages and better career prospects. As 
they actually have (or want) to work more in these positions, given the same 
formal working time, they benefit from an actual wage advantage – i.e., after 
correcting for actual working time – only some years after graduation. 
 
These findings should be regarded as first results. The data collected under 
the name “graduate studies” (Absolventenstudien) by the Swiss Federal Office 
offer material for further analyses. A third wave of the survey is planned, 
allowing for long-term analyses ten years after graduation. The basic (first 
wave) survey will, in the future, contain questions about grades, which will 
lead to pooled data for different cohorts containing grade information. Finally, 
the data set analysed in this article can further be exploited. The panel feature 
of the data has not yet been used, as we applied separate cross-section 
regressions here. Tracing the wage development of individuals is possible; 
this is, however, more demanding in terms of the number of observations and 
data quality. The frequent changes of items between the 1999 and the 2002 
questionnaire are bothersome for this. 
 
In the light of the findings presented in this article we conclude that grades 
have a non-negligible effect on wages. This is good news for researchers that 
use grades as a educational outcome measure (including value-added 
models). The scant number of studies on the link between grades and wages, 
however, reveals a real gap in the literature and calls for more empirical 
investigation: Which effect do grades still have eight or more years after 
graduation? Can similar effects of grades be found for university graduates in 
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other countries? Do grades matter for people with other educational degrees? 
How well do students’ expectations of wage gains due to higher grades match 
real wage increases? The effect of grades should be put on the research 
agenda of education and labour economists. 
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Appendix 
 
A. Summary Statistics 
 
Variables in italics have not usually been used in wage regressions (but for 
the Heckman or ordered probit regressions). 
* indicates that more information concerning the respective variable can be 
found in part B of the appendix. 
The number of observations N has been determined by including those cases 
that have been included either in the annual or the hourly wage regression (for 
1999 or 2002, respectively). 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Grades *      
grade 1764 0.5419 0.2030 0 1 
grade dummy 0 - 0.2 1764 0.0539 0.2258 0 1 
grade dummy 0.2 - 0.4 1764 0.1797 0.3841 0 1 
grade dummy 0.4 - 0.6 1764 0.4138 0.4927 0 1 
grade dummy 0.6 - 0.8 1764 0.2738 0.4460 0 1 
grade dummy 0.8 - 1 1764 0.0913 0.2881 0 1 
grade 1st quintile 1763 0.2734 0.4458 0 1 
grade 2nd quintile 1763 0.3216 0.4672 0 1 
grade 3rd quintile 1763 0.3642 0.4813 0 1 
grade 4th quintile 1763 0.3018 0.4592 0 1 
grade 5th quintile 1763 0.2513 0.4339 0 1 
grade standardized 1 1763 -0.0276 0.9742 -4.080 2.910 
grade standardized 2 1764 -0.0246 0.9875 -3.321 2.825 
Grades interacted      
grade X (Arts & Humanities, 
Social Sciences) 1764 0.1232 0.2557 0 1 
grade X (Business, 
Economics) 1764 0.0773 0.1846 0 0.915 
grade X Law 1764 0.0722 0.1772 0 0.95 
grade X Science 1764 0.0813 0.2247 0 1 
grade X (Medicine, 
Pharmacy) 1764 0.0741 0.2066 0 1 
grade X Technical Sciences 1764 0.1016 0.2328 0 1 
grade X Other Subjects 1764 0.0121 0.0887 0 0.875 
Universities      
Univ. Basel 1764 0.0884 0.2840 0 1 
Univ. Berne 1764 0.1264 0.3324 0 1 
Univ. Fribourg 1764 0.0771 0.2668 0 1 
Univ. Geneva 1764 0.0777 0.2677 0 1 
Univ. Lausanne 1764 0.1020 0.3028 0 1 
Swiss Fed. Inst. of 
Technology Lausanne 
(EPFL) 1764 0.0714 0.2576 0 1 
Univ. Neuchâtel 1764 0.0238 0.1525 0 1 
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Univ. St. Gall (HSG) 1764 0.0391 0.1939 0 1 
Univ. Zurich 1764 0.2154 0.4112 0 1 
Swiss Fed. Inst. of 
Technology Zurich (ETHZ) 1764 0.1740 0.3792 0 1 
Other 1764 0.0034 0.0582 0 1 
unknown 1764 0.0011 0.0337 0 1 
Subjects      
Arts & Humanities, 
Social Sciences 1764 0.2069 0.4052 0 1 
Business & Economics 1764 0.1735 0.3788 0 1 
Law 1764 0.1689 0.3748 0 1 
Science 1764 0.1281 0.3343 0 1 
Medicine, Pharmacy 1764 0.1270 0.3330 0 1 
Technical Sciences 1764 0.1763 0.3812 0 1 
Other Subjects 1764 0.0193 0.1375 0 1 
Individual characteristics      
Male 1764 0.6083 0.4883 0 1 
Foreigner 1764 0.1695 0.3753 0 1 
Age 1764 27.8980 3.2188 20 49 
No. of children * 1764 0.0720 0.3688 0 4 
Study length (no. of 
semesters) 1764 10.9802 2.8142 6 25 
Jobbed during study: relation 
to study 1764 0.2200 0.4143 0 1 
Jobbed during study: no 
relation to study 1764 0.2613 0.4395 0 1 
Maturität with cantonal 
approval 1764 0.1173 0.3219 0 1 
Eidgenössische Maturität  1764 0.0448 0.2069 0 1 
Maturität in foreign country 1764 0.0244 0.1543 0 1 
Maturität other 1764 0.0459 0.2094 0 1 
former educational degrees:      
upper secondary level 1764 0.0850 0.2790 0 1 
teachers licence 1764 0.0210 0.1433 0 1 
tertiary vocational diploma 1764 0.0028 0.0532 0 1 
higher professional school 1764 0.0102 0.1005 0 1 
other university diploma 1764 0.0153 0.1228 0 1 
other education 1764 0.0368 0.1884 0 1 
weekly time for sports 1724 3.8028 3.2007 0 20 
Current job characteristics      
ln annual wage 99 * 1716 11.0658 0.3650 9.800 11.948 
ln hourly wage 99 * 1722 3.4011 0.3648 2.205 4.408 
Potential experience * 1764 9.6663 4.0328 0 28 
Part-time work 1764 0.1531 0.3601 0 1 
Internship * 1764 0.1757 0.3807 0 1 
Assistant at University * 1764 0.1032 0.3043 0 1 
External Doctorand * 1764 0.0266 0.1611 0 1 
Public Service * 1764 0.3849 0.4867 0 1 
Other institution * 1764 0.0142 0.1182 0 1 
Private Firm, 1 - 9 
employees * 1764 0.1241 0.3298 0 1 
Private Firm, 10 - 49 
employees * 1764 0.1100 0.3130 0 1 
Private Firm, 50 - 99 
employees * 1764 0.0374 0.1898 0 1 
Private Firm, 100 - 499 1764 0.0777 0.2677 0 1 
43 
employees * 
Private Firm, 500+ 
employees * 1764 0.2324 0.4225 0 1 
Training >6 month 
completed 1764 0.0397 0.1953 0 1 
Training >6 month started 1764 0.0079 0.0888 0 1 
Job Temporary: <1 year 1764 0.1253 0.3311 0 1 
Job Temporary: 1-2 year 1764 0.2211 0.4151 0 1 
Job Temporary: 2-3 year 1764 0.0618 0.2408 0 1 
Job Temporary: >3 year 1764 0.0471 0.2118 0 1 
Job Temporary: unknown 1764 0.0164 0.1272 0 1 
Job adequate: use 
knowledge 1764 1.5266 0.7316 1 4 
Job adequate: exert 
influence 1755 1.8530 0.8374 1 4 
economic sector      
University 1764 0.0969 0.2960 0 1 
University of Applied 
Science 1764 0.0159 0.1250 0 1 
Schools 1764 0.0300 0.1708 0 1 
Judiciary 1764 0.1168 0.3212 0 1 
Information and Culture 1764 0.0329 0.1784 0 1 
Health Care 1764 0.1321 0.3387 0 1 
Pedagogical, psychological, 
social services 1764 0.0249 0.1560 0 1 
Agriculture 1764 0.0074 0.0856 0 1 
Industry 1764 0.1599 0.3666 0 1 
Services 1764 0.1576 0.3645 0 1 
Financial services 1764 0.1355 0.3423 0 1 
Public service 1764 0.0726 0.2595 0 1 
Church 1764 0.0000 0.0000 0 0 
Associations/Organisations 1764 0.0153 0.1228 0 1 
Other 1764 0.0017 0.0412 0 1 
unknown 1764 0.0006 0.0238 0 1 
Region of residence *      
Zurich 1764 0.2438 0.4295 0 1 
Berne 1764 0.1066 0.3087 0 1 
Lucerne 1764 0.0397 0.1953 0 1 
Uri 1764 0.0023 0.0476 0 1 
Schwyz 1764 0.0159 0.1250 0 1 
Obwalden 1764 0.0034 0.0582 0 1 
Nidwalden 1764 0.0034 0.0582 0 1 
Glarus 1764 0.0006 0.0238 0 1 
Zug 1764 0.0147 0.1205 0 1 
Fribourg 1764 0.0363 0.1870 0 1 
Solothurn 1764 0.0255 0.1577 0 1 
Basel Stadt 1764 0.0482 0.2142 0 1 
Basel Landschaft 1764 0.0351 0.1842 0 1 
Schaffhausen 1764 0.0074 0.0856 0 1 
Appenzell Ausserrhoden 1764 0.0011 0.0337 0 1 
St. Gall 1764 0.0346 0.1828 0 1 
Graubünden 1764 0.0153 0.1228 0 1 
Aargau 1764 0.0505 0.2189 0 1 
Thurgau 1764 0.0096 0.0977 0 1 
Ticino 1764 0.0357 0.1856 0 1 
Vaud 1764 0.1139 0.3178 0 1 
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Valais 1764 0.0334 0.1799 0 1 
Neuchâtel 1764 0.0244 0.1543 0 1 
Genêve 1764 0.0658 0.2479 0 1 
Jura 1764 0.0040 0.0629 0 1 
unknown 1764 0.0289 0.1676 0 1 
Table 9: Summary Statistics 1999 (one year after graduation) for variables used in regression 
models (N: only valid cases in annual or hourly wage regressions1999) 
 
 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Grades *      
grade 1735 0.5540 0.2053 0 1 
grade dummy 0 - 0.2 1735 0.0513 0.2207 0 1 
grade dummy 0.2 - 0.4 1735 0.1654 0.3717 0 1 
grade dummy 0.4 - 0.6 1735 0.4115 0.4923 0 1 
grade dummy 0.6 - 0.8 1735 0.2807 0.4495 0 1 
grade dummy 0.8 - 1 1735 0.1037 0.3050 0 1 
grade 1st quintile 1733 0.2654 0.4417 0 1 
grade 2nd quintile 1733 0.3145 0.4644 0 1 
grade 3rd quintile 1733 0.3676 0.4823 0 1 
grade 4th quintile 1733 0.3024 0.4594 0 1 
grade 5th quintile 1733 0.2706 0.4444 0 1 
grade standardized 1 1733 0.0153 0.9802 -4.0800 2.9097 
grade standardized 2 1734 0.0177 0.9885 -3.3209 2.8251 
Grades interacted      
grade X (Arts & Humanities, 
Social Sciences) 1735 0.1294 0.2649 0 1 
grade X (Business, 
Economics) 1735 0.0782 0.1862 0 0.915 
grade X Law 1735 0.0644 0.1697 0 0.95 
grade X Science 1735 0.0968 0.2442 0 1 
grade X (Medicine, 
Pharmacy) 1735 0.0776 0.2120 0 1 
grade X Technical Sciences 1735 0.0923 0.2240 0 1 
grade X Other Subjects 1735 0.0150 0.0978 0 0.875 
Universities      
Univ. Basel 1735 0.0899 0.2861 0 1 
Univ. Berne 1735 0.1297 0.3361 0 1 
Univ. Fribourg 1735 0.0749 0.2634 0 1 
Univ. Geneva 1735 0.0836 0.2768 0 1 
Univ. Lausanne 1735 0.1037 0.3050 0 1 
Swiss Fed. Inst. of 
Technology Lausanne 
(EPFL) 1735 0.0669 0.2498 0 1 
Univ. Neuchâtel 1735 0.0254 0.1573 0 1 
Univ. St. Gall (HSG) 1735 0.0386 0.1927 0 1 
Univ. Zurich 1735 0.2069 0.4052 0 1 
Swiss Fed. Inst. of 
Technology Zurich (ETHZ) 1735 0.1764 0.3812 0 1 
Other 1735 0.0035 0.0587 0 1 
unknown 1735 0.0006 0.0240 0 1 
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Subjects      
Arts & Humanities, 
Social Sciences 1735 0.2110 0.4081 0 1 
Business & Economics 1735 0.1758 0.3808 0 1 
Law 1735 0.1493 0.3565 0 1 
Science 1735 0.1476 0.3548 0 1 
Medicine, Pharmacy 1735 0.1314 0.3379 0 1 
Technical Sciences 1735 0.1602 0.3669 0 1 
Other Subjects 1735 0.0242 0.1537 0 1 
Individual characteristics      
Male 1735 0.6277 0.4836 0 1 
Foreigner 1735 0.1643 0.3706 0 1 
Age 1735 30.7850 3.1970 23 56 
No. of children * 1735 0.1787 0.5563 0 4 
Study length (no. of 
semesters) 1735 10.9170 2.8558 6 26 
Jobbed during study: relation 
to study 1735 0.2231 0.4164 0 1 
Jobbed during study: no 
relation to study 1735 0.2559 0.4365 0 1 
Maturität with cantonal 
approval 1735 0.1141 0.3180 0 1 
Eidgenössische Maturität  1735 0.0438 0.2047 0 1 
Maturität in foreign country 1735 0.0225 0.1483 0 1 
Maturität other 1735 0.0507 0.2195 0 1 
former educational degrees: 1735 0.0778 0.2679 0 1 
upper secondary level 1735 0.0271 0.1624 0 1 
teachers licence 1735 0.0040 0.0634 0 1 
tertiary vocational diploma 1735 0.0133 0.1144 0 1 
higher professional school 1735 0.0104 0.1014 0 1 
other university diploma 1735 0.0363 0.1871 0 1 
other education 1735 10.9170 2.8558 6 26 
Current job characteristics      
ln annual wage 02 * 1704 11.4650 0.2991 9.7981 12.2061 
ln hourly wage 02 * 1696 3.8065 0.3420 2.2318 4.6886 
Potential Experience * 1735 3.9226 0.5802 0 4.7068 
Part-time work 1735 0.2450 0.4302 0 1 
Internship * 1725 0.1090 0.3117 0 1 
Assistant/Doctorand * 1735 0.0986 0.2982 0 1 
Medical Assistant * 1735 0.0882 0.2836 0 1 
Public Service * 1735 0.3602 0.4802 0 1 
Association/Organisation * 1735 0.0282 0.1657 0 1 
Other institution * 1735 0.0248 0.1555 0 1 
Private Firm, 1.5 - 5 
employees * 1735 0.2945 0.4560 0 1 
Private Firm, 6 - 49 
employees * 1735 0.0847 0.2786 0 1 
Private Firm, 50 - 249 
employees * 1735 0.1447 0.3519 0 1 
Private Firm, 250 - 500 
employees * 1735 0.0467 0.2110 0 1 
Freelance, alone * 1735 0.0081 0.0895 0 1 
Training >6 month 
completed or started 1735 0.4859 0.4999 0 1 
Job Temporary 1690 0.2538 0.4353 0 1 
My job offers: use 1730 3.4191 0.7632 1 4 
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knowledge 
My job offers: exert influence 1728 3.3530 0.7051 1 4 
economic sector      
University 1735 0.0928 0.2902 0 1 
University of Applied 
Science 1735 0.0046 0.0678 0 1 
Schools 1735 0.0484 0.2147 0 1 
Judiciary 1735 0.0703 0.2558 0 1 
Information and Culture 1735 0.0340 0.1813 0 1 
Health Care 1735 0.1297 0.3361 0 1 
Pedagogical, psychological, 
social services 1735 0.0202 0.1406 0 1 
Agriculture 1735 0.0040 0.0634 0 1 
Industry 1735 0.1706 0.3763 0 1 
Services 1735 0.1545 0.3615 0 1 
Financial services 1735 0.1412 0.3483 0 1 
Public service 1735 0.0899 0.2861 0 1 
Church 1735 0.0006 0.0240 0 1 
Associations/Organisations 1735 0.0190 0.1366 0 1 
Other 1735 0.0138 0.1168 0 1 
unknown 1735 0.0063 0.0794 0 1 
Region of work *      
Zurich 1735 0.2640 0.4409 0 1 
Berne 1735 0.1078 0.3102 0 1 
Lucerne 1735 0.0357 0.1857 0 1 
Uri 1735 0.0029 0.0536 0 1 
Schwyz 1735 0.0127 0.1119 0 1 
Obwalden 1735 0.0052 0.0719 0 1 
Nidwalden 1735 0.0023 0.0480 0 1 
Glarus 1735 0.0012 0.0339 0 1 
Zug 1735 0.0150 0.1215 0 1 
Fribourg 1735 0.0334 0.1798 0 1 
Solothurn 1735 0.0161 0.1260 0 1 
Basel Stadt 1735 0.0484 0.2147 0 1 
Basel Landschaft 1735 0.0300 0.1706 0 1 
Schaffhausen 1735 0.0052 0.0719 0 1 
Appenzell Ausserrhoden 1735 0.0029 0.0536 0 1 
St. Gall 1735 0.0259 0.1590 0 1 
Graubünden 1735 0.0144 0.1192 0 1 
Aargau 1735 0.0507 0.2195 0 1 
Thurgau 1735 0.0110 0.1041 0 1 
Ticino 1735 0.0311 0.1737 0 1 
Vaud 1735 0.1170 0.3215 0 1 
Valais 1735 0.0259 0.1590 0 1 
Neuchâtel 1735 0.0225 0.1483 0 1 
Genêve 1735 0.0749 0.2634 0 1 
Jura 1735 0.0086 0.0926 0 1 
unknown 1735 0.0334 0.1798 0 1 
Table 10: Summary Statistics 2002 (four years after graduation) for variables used in 
regression models (N: only valid cases in annual or hourly wage regressions 2002) 
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B. Definition of variables 
 
This section contains additional information about variables that are marked 
(*) in table 9 or 10. Information that has already been given in the text of the 
article will not be repeated. 
 
• grade variables 
As reported in section 3 of the text, grade variables were computed from the 
variables “reported grade”, ig , and “reported grade scale”, maxg  and ming . In 
principle, the scale variables have been edited considering the valid scales 
that were indicated for the same strata, i.e. the same university, same subject 
and same diploma. Editing was applied according to the following rules: 
 
- Obvious confusion between the minimum and the maximum grade was 
corrected. “Obvious” means that the indicated grade lay within the sufficient 
range of the (corrected) scale and this scale existed in the respective strata. 
- Minimal grades were corrected if they had been misinterpreted as minimal 
sufficient grade or as own minimal grade during study. 
- Missing minimal grades were imputed if “1” if the indicated maximum grade 
was 4, 5, 6, 8 or 10 and the indicated grade lay within the respective sufficient 
scale. 
- If no scale at all had been indicated, we imputed a scale only if there existed 
only one valid scale in this strata. Due to students that graduated according to 
old study regimes with other scales, there exist numerous strata with more 
than one valid scale. We deemed it too risky to impute scales in these cases. 
 
For the different specifications of the grade variables, see section 3. 
 
 
• number of children 
This variable is directly relevant for wage regressions in Switzerland as 
parents receive federal subsidies as a wage component. 
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• wage variables 
Wages of the year 99 have first been transformed to make them directly 
comparable with the 2002 wages. From the well-known Fisher-Formula, we 
get the formula for the wage inflation rate between 1999 and 2002: 
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Where Ri is the wage inflation rate, Rn is the nominal wage growth rate and Rr 
is the real wage growth rate. Using the nominal and real wage indices ( wi ) of 
the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (see Die Volkswirtschaft 11/2003: 99), we 
get the factor to “inflationate” the 1999 wages: 
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The 1999 wages have been multiplied by this factor and are, thus, measured 
in CHF with the base year 2002. 
 
Outliers have then been deleted according to the following rules: 
Annual Wage 1999: valid if wage higher than 36’000 CHF (higher than 18’000 
for internships) and smaller than 160’000 CHF. 
Hourly Wage 1999: valid if wage higher than 13 CHF/h (higher than 9 for 
internships) and smaller than 90 CHF/h and if the reported working hours per 
year are higher than half the formal working hours reported and smaller or 
equal than 80 hours per week. 
Annual Wage 2002: valid if wage higher than 36’000 (higher than 18’000 for 
internships) and smaller than 200’000. 
Hourly Wage 2002: valid if wage higher than 13 CHF/h (higher than 9 for 
internships) and smaller than 110 CHF/h and if the reported working hours per 
year are higher than half the formal working hours reported and smaller or 
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equal than 80 hours per week. 
 
The different rules for annual and hourly wages lead to different valid N, as 
reported in the tables in the text. 
After these transformations, log wage variables were computed for regression 
analyses. 
 
 
• Potential Experience 
This variable was computed as follows: 
Experience = Date of respective survey – date of graduation – months until 
first job 
 
 
• Internship, University assistant, External Doctorand, Medical Assistant 
The categories “University assistant” and “external doctorand” have been 
combined in the questionnaire for 2002, which should not cause major 
problems. More problematic is the introduction of the last category, “medical 
assistant” in the 2002 questionnaire. It is unclear whether it should be 
included in the 2002 regressions or not. As a large number of medical 
graduates indicated a internship position in 1999, we decided to include the 
medical assistant dummy. Due to this, the interpretation of the subject dummy 
“Medicine, Pharmacy” might not be comparable between the 1999 and 2002 
regressions. 
 
 
• Public Service, Association/Organisation, Other institution 
These dummies were designed to capture jobs that are not situated in the 
private economy. The last dummy has been added only in the 2002 
questionnaire, so the significance of the “other institution” changes between 
both surveys. 
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• Private firm, no. of employees 
These dummies have directly been asked as categories in the respective 
questionnaires. The change in the number of employees defining the 
dummies originates in a change of the item between the questionnaires 99 
and 02. 
 
 
• Region of residence, Region of work 
For 1999, we include the region of residence as a proxy for the region of work. 
For 2002, the actual region of work has been asked. 
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C. Overview of results for separate regressions for females and males 
 
OLS Female Male 
 1999 2002 1999 2002 
wage annual hourly annual hourly annual hourly annual hourly 
grade     +  + + 
grade standardized 1 + (+)   + (+) + + 
grade X (Arts & Humanities, Social 
Sciences)         
grade X (Business, Economics)       + + 
grade X Law + (+)  (-) + +   
grade X Science         
grade X (Medicine, Pharmacy)   (+)      
grade X Technical Sciences       + + 
grade X Other Subjects +        
Table 11: Coefficient signs for wage regressions run separately for females and males; signs are reported if significant on the 5 percent level, in brackets if 
significant on the 10 percent level 
